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ABSTRACT 
The paper is a product of a recent brief trip to Tanzania 
and discusses the circumstances and implications of the revival of 
district councils and cooperatives. The change is viewed against a 
background of long-term economic crisis and rising peasant politi-
cal complaint and marks the reversal of a 15 year rise of statism 
in the countryside. Reasons for the earlier demise of councils and 
cooperatives are examined as well as the inadequacies of subsequent 
"participatory" policy, The nature and design of the reincarnated 
institutions are reviewed and several questions about their oper-
ation are raised. Reasons for the likely revival of peasant initia-
tive in self-help are also discussed. In conclusion, although 
there has been no widespread public discussion of these changes 
and their implication for a transition to socialism, and although 
there is an air of "muddling through" a difficult situation, there 
are good reasons to see these moves as logical and quite positive 
steps on a democratic socialist and more productive path. 
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"The government has been stolen from us and we want it back." 
According to an informal observer this was the essence of collective 
complaint by villagers to President Julius Nyerere and other leaders 
when they toured the countryside in 1979. The complaint was not in vain, 
however, as three years later (April 1982) legislation was passed to 
bring "government" back •— to revive district councils and cooperatives 
(2) 
which had been abolished in the 1970s. These and related moves can 
be seen as a significant reversal of a 15 year (1967-1982) trend toward 
statist policy in the countryside, portions of which have proved to be 
unpopular and unproductive. The term "statism" is here used to connote 
state policy that puts an expanding array of economic activity under 
central government control, while diminishing avenues of popular parti-
cipation. This paper will describe these institutional changes as well 
as attempt to explain and assess tneir significance in light of Tanzania's 
recent history. 
The Economic Context of Institutional Change 
The revival of district councils must be seen against a back-
ground of long-term economic crisis that inevitably threatens the poli-
tical legitimacy of the regime. A comprehensive 19 82 International Labour 
Organization report, points to the vicious cycle that Tanzania has, to 
some degree, entered.^^ With stagnant to slowly rising export volume over 
a number of years, coupled with the rising cost of necessary imports, 
there is a serious shortage of foreign exchange — and this despite the 
state's historical ability to obtain large amounts of foreign aid on con-
cessionary terms, and despite historically tight import controls. With 
many necessary inputs to industry lacking, industry runs at '20% to 30% of 
capacity, and this means there are spot shortates of virtually all basic 
consumer items in the countryside with correspondingly less incentive for 
(4) 
[producers to produce exports hence the cycle is complete. 
A bright spot on the horizon is a projected good 1983 cotton 
crop, but economic trends and the most recent data for 1982 do not paint 
(5) 
an optimistic picture. Real GDP dropped by 3.2% while the manufacturing 
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sector recorded a 25.4% fall in volume which follows successive drops of 
27.1% and 18.8%. It also appears that the special National Economic 
Survival Program met only 58% of its 1982 export earnings target, while 
the public foreign debt is now estimated at about $2.5 billion. As of 
the end of July 1983, talks with the IMF that could yield a long-term 
IMF and World Bank loan of about $600 million are stalled. Government 
has devalued the Tanzanian shilling by 20% against the dollar and raised 
prices of major export crops about 40% in July 1983, but the IMF reportedly 
wants a devaluation of up to 75%, a 45% export crop price rise, a 25% 
rise for food crops, a ceiling on government borrowing, and a doubling 
of interest rates
r
, President Nyerere has balked particularly against the 
measures which will hurt the urban poor and also pose a grave short run 
political risk for the regime. 
The economic situation is severe, and although most third world 
countries are experiencing analogous problems in the face of world economic 
crisis, most observers agree with the basically sympathetic IL0 report 
that Tanzania's problems are internal as well as external. In these times 
of duress regimes may respond by tightening controls at the center. But 
this regime decided that prior policies along those lines had proved 
counter-productive economically and politically and hence something diffe-
rent was in order. Part of the regime's solution to its internal problems 
is a revival of district councils and cooperatives. 
The Rise of Statism in the Countryside 
In order to understand the current retreat from statism in the 
countryside we need a basic understanding of the rise aof statism and sub-
sequent difficulties. Those familiar with the writings of President Nyerere 
and Party documents are also familiar with their participatory rather than 
statist thrust. Nyerere has, after all, virtually defined development in 
terms of mass involvement. The 1971 Guidelines of the Party made this 
point in extreme fashion. 
Any action that gives them (the people) more 
control of their own affairs is an action of 
development even if it does not offer them 
better health or bread. 
The irony is that while the Tanzanian state has brought extraordinary 
progress in the realm of basic needs, esp. primary education, health, and 
water supply, few would argue that it provided the people with "...more 
control of their own affairs..," and hence the growing volume of complaint 
(6) 
reaching the President's ears by the late 1970s. 
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But.why, we might ask, were district councils and cooperatives 
abolished in the first place and in the context of an ideology of parti-
cipation? We should note at the outset that both institutions did not 
suffer sudden death so much as slow attrition in the face of state 
intrusion which made their abolition somewhat anti-climatic. Many 
district councils evolved chronic debts in the 1960s, and there were fre-
(7) 
quent allegations of inefficiency and corruption. There was also 
considerable tension between councillors, council staff, and functional 
officers of ministries in the districts. The state explained its 
escalating intrusion into council affairs in terms of both dealing with 
these problems and of asserting the power of the center over subordinate 
units of government. Central control primarily through regional and 
area commissioners whose clout was considerable because they were presi-
dential appointees and representatives of both party and government. The 
Local Government Service Commission acted as the recruiting agent for 
council staff and hence councils were no longer able to hire and fire 
their employees. In 1965 the power of the ruling party was inserted into 
council affairs by making the elected district party chairperson the 
automatic chairperson of the council Ana in the same year technical 
ministry personnel were brought into the councils' planning committee 
From 1966 the party vetted the nominations of district councillors much 
as it did with elections to the National Assembly. In 1969 responsibility 
for education, health, and district roads was taken away from councils 
and, with these responsibilities removed, local tax rates and produce 
cesses were later abolished. It was mere formality to abolish the councils 
altogether in 1972. 
Cooperatives were similarly accused of fostering corruption and 
inefficiency and of being run by, and primarily for, wealthy peasants. 
Some argued, that they were simply exploiting institutions.^^ Cooperative 
unions, led by the rural petty bourgeoisie, were also something of a 
political treat in post-Arusha Declaration Tanzania. As with the experience 
of district councils, a variety of government intrusions did not rectify 
the situation and all the while the state rather surprisingly mandated more 
roles for cooperatives to perform. Increasingly, cooperatives became 
agents of state institutions and member involvement and commitment declined. 
In May 1976 Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa abolished cooperative unions 
while primary societies were already redundant by 1975 because newly created 
villages were designated basic collection points for specialized crop 
authorities. 
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But w h i l e district councils and cooperatives were on their 
way out, two new state thrusts were supposed to expand mass participation. 
A highly touted 1972 government decentralization — bringing government 
to the people — did just that, but did not augment participation. Vir-
tually every observer has noted that the basic structure was dominated by 
a more numerous, if better coordinated, bureaucracy. A great deal of 
effort was put into bottom-up planning which usually meant that villages 
forwarded lengthy "wish lists" of projects in hopes that they might get 
one or two. Usually after a considerable period of time government would 
indicate its choices (not necessarily village priorities) and villagers 
were then expected to contribute labor, and perhaps material and money. 
Villagers thus became auxilliaries of government projects. As a result 
there was little incentive for locally initiated self-help activity because 
government was seen to give what it decided to give when it wanted to give. 
The chairperson of one village summed it up as follows: "It is better we 
wait for them (government) to plan things for us rather than (we) plan 
things they do not w a n t " /
1 0
 ^  
A second participatory thrust came in the aftermath of a frankly 
coercive effort to create villages in the years 1973-1975 after ujamaa 
vijijini failed to develop a popular dynamic. Under the Villages and 
Ujamaa Villages Act of July 1975 all adult members of a village constitute 
the Village Assembly which elects a Village Council while the chairperson 
and secretary of the local party branch serve respectively as chairperson 
and secretary of the c o u n c i l . T h e Councils now meet regularly and, 
coupled with the party cell system, the result is a highly organized country-
side with an embryo socialized sector. Roughly two-thirds of the villages 
have small communal farms and usually other communal activity like a shop 
or a maize grinding mill/
1
"'' The. structure is fine as far as it goes but 
the atomized character of villages, and the lack of significant higher level 
participatory structures, means that peasants did not gain the tactical 
autonomy vis a vis the state that some wanted, while their influence could 
not really aggregate and make itself felt at higher levels. Elected Party 
officials and 'M.P.s act as village advocates in self-help activities, but 
their power is hemmed in.by the planning structure and they are primarily 
expected to implement higher level policy. 
Crop authorities and regional trading corporations took over the 
marketing and distributing roles of the cooperative structure. But it was 
one thing to service 1300 primary societies and another to service the now 
5 
over 8600 villages. And this had to be accomplished with limited capital 
and management resources. For these reasons, and those associated with a 
deteriorating economy, the system frequently broke down as produce was 
occasionally not collected, nor inputs provided on time; and payment to 
producers were delayed. Meanwhile producers had no structures through 
(13) 
which to voice complaints, and allegations of mismanagement and mis-
appropriation of funds in crop authorities soon rivaled their predecessors. 
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The Retreat From Statism in The Countryside 
By the arrival af the 19 80s a minimal consensus-- though 
not without continuing opposition— emerged at the highest level 
of the regime and, found statist policy in the countryside wanting. 
Complaints from below eventually did get through and the very 
fiscal poverty of the state prompted rethinking about ways of rai-
sing revenues for public purposes which the state was unable to 
mobilize. For these reasons district councils and cooperatives 
appeared to offer an answer. They may have presented problems 
in the past, but they would probably be an improvement over their 
successors. 
At the same time that these changes were on the drawing 
board another important legal measure was taken to divorce the 
government and party roles which were formerly combined in the 
area and regional commissioners. This move, was advocated by 
some intellectuals at the top as an important shift toward 
democracy. When the commissioners wore two hats there was 
considerable opportunity for abuse of power. The party was also 
implicated in all major decisions in the countryside and hence 
it could not act as a '''watchdog" to criticize those decisions 
if necessary. The separation will, it is argued, foster a 
more "pure" Party that can be better used as an avenue of complaint 
and critique from below.
1 5 
But what will the reincarnated institutions look like? 
The revival of district council is officially explained as an 
extension of "incomplete decentralization," Explaining the 
change in terms of continuity is partly a face-saving device 
but the councils will in fact build upon the administrative 
changes of decentralization in 19 72 and result in a far more 
radical devolution of power than existed in the post-colonial 
council system. The new councils will be responsible for all 
major ministry functions except law and order. If, for example 
the Ministry of Agriculture has a nationwide projects on rinder-
pest control, each council will have to be convinced to support 
the program. Although senior ministry personnel will be recruited 
and allocated by the Local Government Service Commission, they 
will be employees of councils and will be hired and fired by them. 
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•Councils will also raise -their" own revsnue (rates subject to 
central government approval) probably mainly by poll taxes, 
and the central government will also contribute a portion of 
16 
the total budget with an eye to encouraging regional equity. 
In other words districts with a limited economic base will receive 
a greater portion of their budget from the central government. 
Although the new council system has officially gone into 
effect July 1, 1983, several crucial questions remain. How will 
the districts quickly raise funds without alienating the popu-
lation? How will the central government contribution be calcu-
lated? Can the apparently extreme divorce of local officers 
from parent ministries— a problem cited in prior decentralization 
a r r a n g e m e n t s — be dealt with under a structure that appears to 
17 
divorce the relationship even further? And will councils be 
as frugal as some officials hope? In other words will the 
councils have an interest in saving money because the money is 
"theirs" and not the "central government's", or will they hire 
brothers, sisters, and friends to the point of rendendancy? 
Also, if many of the councils were financially weak in the past 
there is no particular reason to suppose they will not similar 
problems in the future unless perhaps, as Gelase Mutahaba suggests, 
government devolves functions differentially according to a loca-18 
lity's capacity to sustain various activities. 
In the proposed cooperative structure primary societies 
will service one or more villages while second tier cooperative 
unions will service primary societies by marketing products, 
providing inputs, credit, financial advise, etc. The structure 
is capped by an apex organization of union representatives. The 
legislation, it should be said, gives considerable latitude for 
the state to intervene in cooperative affairs if it so desires. 
The relevant Minister @r Registrar Cooperatives may appoint party 
members in key cooperative positions; the Registrar must approve 
cooperative appointments and may fire employees as well; and the 
Registrar may direct a cooperative committee to invest in coope-
rative funds. Although the details of marketing arrangements 
are being debated within the state, the major export crops will 
probably be sold to crop authorities, while non-controlled crops 
19 
will be sold hoever the cooperatives wish. Another vital 
'detail that has yet to be worked out is whether cooperative * 
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membership will be voluntary or not. At the start there was 
agreement that voluntarism was necessary in order to garner pea-
sant commitment. This position was supported by the Commission 
looking into the re-establishment of cooperatives, the Cabinet, 
the National Executive Committee of the party, and by Scandinavian 
donors and a post-legislation team from the U.S.A. Then, to the 
surprise of all, a hot Parliamentary debate resulted in a change 
making cooperative membership compulsory. But the last word on 
the issue is still to come. 
The practical problems of re-establishing the cooperative 
structure are, of course, formidable. It is unclear how the 
cooperatives will be capitalized when the debts of the pre-1976 
ones have yet to be settled. And since the crop authorities took 
over much of the capital of the earlier cooperative unions , will 
some of it be returned? And how will trained staff be quickly 
recruited? The former staff was absorbed into a variety of 
governmental structures and it is unclear whether they can be 
enticed back to autonomous cooperatives especially when they 
may be currently remunerated at a higher rate than cooperatives 
can afford. 
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The revived district councils and cooperatives are the 
forir.al institutional focus of what I have termed Tanzania's 
retreat frorr, statisrr. in the- countryside. But there is an 
important third arena that is "Likely to be revived in it's 
wake, and that is self-help. Indeed some proponents of the 
formal institutional changes explicitly hope, and expect, 
2 0 
that- self-help processes will take on a new vitality . The 
core reason for Tanzania's somewhat lacklustre self-help 
perforir.ance is related to the structure of power in the 
countryside. The bureaucratic, and geographically mobile, 
element of the petty bourgeoisie gradually consolidated their 
position in party and state apparatus and effectively dominated 
public life to the detriment of the locally rooted rural petty 
21 
bourgeoisie. ' Tanzania's bureaucracy was, of course, led by 
a socialist ideology which delivered on that ideology in the 
form of an extraordinary amount of social arr.enity expenditure. 
But unlike the rural petty bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy in 
the late 1960s and 1970s did not as we have argued, welcome 
self-help outside "the plan"." Although there is some 
tr.erit to bureaucratic complaints about self-help waste, 
duplication, inferior quality, regional inequality, etc., 
reserving initiative to the bureaucracy of party or state 
fundamentally undermined the participatory thrust of regime 
ideology. As the state vigorously pushed its own agenda in 
what is often termed a "campaign style" frorr. the late 1960s 
on — i.e. ujamaa vijijini, decentralization and planning, 
villagization, and universal primary education -- bureaucratic 
initiative inevitably pre-empted peasant initiative. Indications 
of that shift are found in the late 1960s demise of the 
Department of Community Development in favor of a department 
servicing ujamaa production and cooperatives, and in the 
diversion of the Regional Development Fund from assisting 
locally initiated self-help to assisting usually bureaucratically 
initiated ujamaa activity. 
There are several reasons why self-help is likely to 
re-emerge with sorr.e vigor. First, the rise of district councils 
and cooperatives are likely to shift the balance of power in the 
countryside. In other words the power of the state and party 
machinery will be somewhat diminished as the power of the rural 
petty bourgeoisie rises accordingly. Regular elections for the 
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councils and cooperatives will provide incentives for that 
element to lead and support the most popular forrr. of rural 
development which is social amenities in the domain of self-
help. In other words on top of M.P's and elected Party 
officials who have, though not always very effectively, 
been the natural allies of peasant initiated self-help, 
there are now many more that will be involved in the same 
game. This expanded rural petty bourgeoisie leadership 
will control council and cooperative money that will almost 
certainly be used in support of peasant initiated self-help 
as it was in the past. The entire process will help "free" 
self-help from the bureaucratic planning apparatus whose 
prior monopoly of extra-village funds insured the imposition 
of it's development agenda. 
A second reason self-help will probably revive is 
the weak financial position of the state coupled with high 
popular demand for something to happen. If the government 
cannot afford construction costs, then only self-help remains. 
At the present time there*is an enormous pent-up 
demand for secondary education in the aftermath of the push 
23 
for universal primary education. ' Only 2.2% of primary 
school leavers go to 85 government aided heavily foreign 
supported, and tuition free secondary schools. With the 
G1 so-called "private" (but better termed, self-help) 
secondary schools which charge fees, p]us 23 seminaries, 
only 4.2% will go to secondary school. Since government 
revenue is so precarious at the moment it's attitude toward 
village initiative in the building of secondary schools will 24 
be more permissive. The situation applies to primary 
schools and other amenities as well. A Member of the 
National Assembly recently, asked if government planned to 
increase the standard (and over the years, deflated) 
government grant of shs. 10,000/- and shs. 12,000/- to 
villages building one classroom and a teacher's house respectively. 
The Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office replied 
that the government was well aware of the rising costs of 
building materials "... but due to the present economic 
difficulties, it was not possible to increase assistance. 
The responsibility for building classrooms and teacher's 
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quarters lies with the people themselves. The Minister we Fit 
on to urge people to work harder to provide essential services 
25 
for their own development. Conversasions with other 
government officials suggest that the self-help ideology will 
be elevated and I suspect it will conflict with prior 
interpretations of the planning ideology as a vehicle, of 
control. 
A third reason to anticipate a self-help revival lies 
in the 1981 re-establishment of the Department of Community 
Development located in the Prime Minister's Office. For the 
first time since 1972 there is deployment of extension staff 
emphasizing an ideology of local initiative. Also Rural 
Development Fund monies, which were all diverted to ujamaa 
vijijini activity under Regional Development Dii^ectors after 
1972, are now targeted to support general self-help under 
Regional Community Development Officers. 
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CONCLUSION 
The institutional changes discussed here have been 
termed a retreat from statist policy, a movement away from 
something. But one may also see these changes as a positive 
move toward something. Although there has been no public debate 
about the implications of these moves for a transition to 
socialism, and although there is an element of "muddling 
through" a difficult situation, the changes are a logical and 
positive step along a democratic socialist path that will 
probably yield economic dividents as well. The councils, 
cooperatives, and a likely revival of self-help, all invite 
the peasantry to exert somewhat greater management and control 
over their own affairs. The change will expand the number 
of elective, competitive, and partially accountable political 
roles that will enhance to some degree the peasantry's bargain-
ing power with the state across a range of issues. The revived 
institutions will help overcome village atomization and fill 
some of the political void between the very participatory vil~ 
2 6 
lage councils and the higher levels of the bureaucracy. 
. . 27 
The institutions are, then, valuable peasant political space. 
The cooperatives and self-help are among the few mass-based, 
if not mass-led. institutions oriented toward state policy that 
have potential influence over a variety of key everyday policies 
such as crop pricing, agricultural input and marketing services, 
as well as the amount, design, timing, location, and maintenance 
2 8 of social amenities. And the fact of peasant self-help initia 
tive may over time create a somewhat more responsive bureaucracy 
29 
and a more aggressive and capable local leadership structure. 
District Councils are not mass-based but they can be mass-
influenced and they are likely to be important support structure 
for peasant defined needs. 
But the reader may ask if all this institutional ex-
perimentation in Tanzania has not simply brought them back to 
square one and the basic rural institutions inherited at 
independence. There is of course an element of "return" to 
the "retreat". But things are not the same as they were before. 
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This is true in several areas but may be particularly significant 
in the realm of leadership. The changes mark a resurgence of 
the rural petty bourgeoisie, but the Leadership Code barring 
capitalists from political office has made a difference. Although 
it is dodged by some through family and friends, it has tended 
to take the most wealthy at all levels of the political system 
out of formal political roles. Thus the return to councils 
(I am less clear about cooperatives, and I doubt self-help) 
does not necessarily mean a return to old style leadership. 
This time around the leadership may be a bit more petty than 
bourgeois. 
And then there is the illusive factor of peasant 
consciousness. Several observers mentioned the current 
comparatively "high" level of peasant consciousness although it 
was difficult to pin down concrete attributes. Samuel Mushi
1
s 
is one of the few attempts to do so in the context of two 
lengthy village case studies in Morogoro District. In his 
opinion: 
There is little doubt that the post-Arusha 
period has seen many changes in political 
attitudes amongst the workers and the 
peasantry. These changes have resulted 
from policy and demographic factors. At 
the policy level, the norms of 'popular 
participation' have been emphasized in 
various party documents and speeches of 
the central leadership... Although these 
norms may not greatly have altered official 
behavior, there is some evidence of greater 
self-confidence in the villages and more 
courage to confront or bargain with the 
authorities than in the sixties. This 
courage has been reinforced by the 
radio -- which has often reported cases of 
leaders who have been expelled foK^ bad 
leadership or for mistreating the people." 
Mushi goes on to say that electoral participation has steadily 
risen where there are opportunities such as in village and 
national elections. This pattern is attributed to the party 
mobilizational capacity and also to villagization that brought 
31 
together once .isolated homesteads. Other factors might also 
include the rapid expansion of primary education and a very 
successful adult literacy program. With the peasantry's 
consciousness and apparent eagerness to vote and voice their 
opinion, the return of councils, cooperatives, and a more vigorous 
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self-help will greatly expand the areas of participation 
and may bring forth a leadership more representative of the 
majority than in the past. 
Despite the promise of these changes, however, one should 
interpret them with a degreed caution. The fairly lengthy 
delay getting these measures off the ground no doubt reflects 
the great complexity of the enterprise, but it may also 
reflect several references to those with "vested interests" in 
the former institutions who will be asked to give ground to 
councils and cooperatives Regional Development Directors will 
probably lose much of their coordinating role to the councils; 
regional trading corporations will find their formerly dominant 
position in distribution threatened by cooperatives ; and crop 
authority functions will be pealed off or cut back. 
A great deal depends upon both the final details that 
are worked out, and upon the general spirit in which they are 
implemented. But at the very least the new rural institutional 
structures mark a decided shift away from an almost linear 
move toward statism in the countryside. The changes indicate 
a shift of intellectual breeze away from the state as almost 
the sole institution of initiative, accumulation, and regulation 
in the socialist collectivity, to a recognition of the value of 
non-state collectivities in production and politics. There is 
also the implied recognition that these institutions are fully 
compatible, indeed necessary, for democratic socialism as 
President Nyerere has argued so eloquently, A long term 
observer of his courtry's rural development process cautioned 
me not to view the changes as a kind of "new Jerusalem." They 
are in his view, small but significant steps forward. But after 
along conversation it was also clear that he had not felt so 
optimistic in years. 
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FOOTNOTES ' 
1. This paper is an attempt to report and broadly interpret some 
observations made during a brief trip to Tanzania (June 27 - July 19, 1933). 
It is clearly not intended to be a piece of polished research, but the paper 
may have its place in lieu of any written discussion o'f the package of 
events may turn out to be as significant as previously recognized bench-
mark policy such as ujamaa vijijini, decentralization, and villagization. 
2. The main legislation is the Local Government (District Authori-
ties) -Act 1982, and the Cooperative Societies Act 1982. 
3. Basic Needs in Danger: A Basic Needs Oriented Development; Strategy 
for Tanzania. Report to the Government of Tanzania by a Jobs and Skills 
Programme for Africa Basic Needs Miss-ion. Addis Ababa: International Labour 
Organization, 1982. 
4/ There has been a rather vigorous parallel market which has been 
attacked by the current anti-economic-sabateur campaign. While t^ he move 
is broadly popular ("something had to be done about it") it begs a long-
term solution to the situation that gave rise to the behavior in the first 
place. And
v
in the-short-run, and in certain places, it exacerbated short-
ages that were partially relieved by the parallel market. 
5; * The following data is taken from the.Quarterly Economic Review of 
Tanzania, Mozambique, No* 3, 1983.. 
/ % -
Louise Fortmann, p. 117, concludes her judicious and well docu-
.. merited study of state and--peasant relations in the following manner: "The 
most obvious conclusion from this study is that the policy of participatory 
socialism has not really been implemented in Tanzania.
t
 To be sure certain 
formal structures of participation have been established. But it has been 
shown that these structures at best provide pro forma participation. Indeed, 
they sometimes serve primarily as a toc&of a central government in directing 
village activities." Peasants, Officials and Participation in Rural Tanzania: 
Experience with Villagization and Decentralization. Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural 
Development Committee, Center for International. Studies, 1980. 
7. This discussion of the history of district councils fpllows the 
very useful paper by Gelase Mutahaba, "Organization for Development: Tanzania's 
Search for Appropriate Local Level Organizational Forms", mimeo, n.d. 
8. The "Report of the Prime Minister's Commission of Inquiry into the 
Possibility of Re-establishing Comparative Unions, May 1981," which I have 
• not seen, allegedly suggests that -cooperatives were not so bad after all, or 
that alongside their liabilities were several assets: cooperative unions were 
useful links between orop authorities, peasants and corporations for the 
•provision of services; the cooperative structure gave peasants a chance to 
know the market situation, discuss economic issues, and voice their complaints 
and points of view; and cooperatives were usually well-prepared in advance 
of crop collection and hence -there weaa few problems with the collection of 
produce and payment to peasants. 
9. The political motive for the dissolution of cooperatives is 
mentioned in Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development 
Management•in Perspective. London: • e nsmann, 1983, p. 116. There is 
other opinion, however, which.Suggests that cumulative state intervention 
had effectively undermined any political threat. The rural petty bourgeoi-
sie here connotes wealthy peasants, African trading and commercial elements, 
and local immobile civil servants. 
• » 
10. Cited on p. 18 of Frederick E.G. Mallya, "Decentralization and 
Population Participation: The Case of Ilala District, Dar es Salaam Region," 
unpublished B.A. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of 
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